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NOTES AND COMMENTS
APPLYING THE "CONTRACTS BETWEEN LABOR
ORGANIZATIONS" CLAUSE OF TAFT-HARTLEY
SECTION 301: A PLEA FOR RESTRAINT*
TAFT-HARTLEY section 301 (a)'s 1 reference to contracts between labor
organizations, if construed to include charters granted to locals by interna-
tionals, possibly could be used to extend federal jurisdiction over the entire
field of internal union affairs. Section 301 enabled unions to sue and be sued
in federal courts 2 by dearly granting them entity status 3 and providing
federal question jurisdiction 4 over "suits for violation of contracts between
*Burlesque Artists Ass'n v. American Guild of Variety Artists, 42 L.R.R.M. 2818
(S.D.N.Y. 1958).
1. "Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this Act, or between
any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States
having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without
regard to the citizenship of the parties:' Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley
Act) § 301(a), 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1958). [Hereinafter cited as
Taft-Hartley Act § 301.]
2. Taft-Hartley Act § 301 (b). Prior to § 301, unions' capacity to be sued as entities
under diversity jurisdiction in federal courts mras solely dependent upon the status of
unincorporated associations under state law. FED. R. Civ. P. 17 (b) ; see 3 Mooa, FEzm.
Pn.Acric f 17.25 (2d ed. 1948). The common law viewed unions, not as entities, but as
aggregations of individuals. See United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S.
344, 385 (1922) (dictum); Kaplan, Suits Against Unincorporatcd Associations Under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 53 IicE. L. REv. 945 (1955). The common-law
rule required joinder of all members, and thus often prevented suits by and against unions.
See Kaplan, stpra at 946; Sturges, Unincorporated Associations as Parties to Actions,
33 YALE L.J. 383, 384-87 (1924). See generally Forkosch, The Legal Status and Suability
of Labor Organications, 28 TEMP. L.Q. 1, 8-27 (1954) (surveying state law on union
status). Diversity jurisdiction might still be obtained, of course, by carefully choosing
representatives for a suit under the provisions of FW. R. Civ. P. 23(a). See, e.g., Local
192, Am. Fed'n of Teachers v. American Fed'n of Teachers, 44 F. Supp. 345 (&D. Pa.
1942). In such a case, however, the doctrines of real party in interest and indispensable
party can often be used to destroy jurisdiction. See note 33 infra.
3. Any ... labor organization may sue or be sued as an entity and in behalf of the
employees whom it represents in the courts of the United States. Any money
judgment against a labor organization in a district court of the United States shall
be enforceable only against the organization as an entity and against its assets,
and shall not be enforceable against any individual member or his assets.
Taft-Hartley Act § 301(b).
4. See Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957); Bickel & Well-
ington, Legislatfie Purpose and the Judicial Process: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HAIR.
L. REv. 1 (1957); Feinsinger, Enforcement of Labor Agreements-A Nere Era in Col-
lective Bargaining, 43 VA. L. Rav. 1261 (1957).
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an employer and a labor organization... or between any such labor organiza-
tions." The term "contracts" in the employer-union clause encompasses only
collective-bargaining agreements6 On the other hand, a paucity of judicial
interpretation 6 and legislative history 7 has left unclear the nature of the agree-
ments envisioned by Congress as contracts between labor organizations.
The meaning of this clause was the central issue in the recent case of
Burlesque Artists Ass'n v. American Guild of Variety Artists." There, a branch
union, suing in federal court, alleged violations of that part of its international's
constitution which provides that membership in any branch entitles a union artist
to work under the auspices of any other local.9 Burlesque maintained that this
constitution was a contract among the parties to the suit,10 and that 301
between-labor-organizations jurisdiction thus existed. Defendants' 1 motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim was based on the ground that 301 em-
braced only collective-bargaining agreements, and that a union constitution
does not come within this characterization. 12 They further maintained that the
controversy was intraunion, rather than a suit between labor organizations.' a
5. See I NLRB, LFoxsr-AnvE HiSTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEAIENT RLATIONS ACT'r,
1947, at 421-24, 873 (1948) ; 2 id. at 1074, 1133, 1145-46, 1483, 1654; cf. I id. at 297, 336-37,
569-70, 873; 2 id. at 1497 (referring only to employer-union contracts).
6. The only case prior to Burlesque Artists Ass'n v. American Guild of Variety
Artists, 42 L.R.R.M. 2818 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), which squarely faced the problem of the scope
of the labor organizations clause was Sun Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. Industrial Union
of Marine Workers, 95 F. Supp. 50 (E.D. Pa. 1950). Previous cases had ruled only
that the provision was inapplicable to suits by individuals. See Adams v. International
Bhd. of Boilermakers, 262 F2d 835 (10th Cir. 1958); Sterling v. Pipe Fitters' Local,
31 L.R.R.M. 2389 (D. Md. 1953); cf. Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees
v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 348 U.S. 437, 458-61 (1955). Other cases held the provision
inapplicable to suits among factions within a single union. See Snoots v. Vejlupek, 87
F. Supp. 503 (N.D. Ohio 1949); Kriss v. White, 87 F. Supp. 734 (N.D.N.Y. 1949).
7. See notes 17, 18 infra and accompanying text.
8. 42 L.R.R.M. 2818 (S.D.N.Y., 1958).
9. See Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Motion To Dismiss, p. 4:
Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion To Dismiss, p. 2; Associated
Actors and Artistes of America Const. p. 9 (1935) ("Membership, and cards evidencing
the same, shall be interchangeable among Branches ....")
The complaint also alleged illegal revocation of the local's charter. See Plaintiff's
Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Motion To Dismiss, pp. 4, 5; Defendants' Memo-
randum of Law in Support of Motion To Dismiss, p. 2; note 29 infra.
10. Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Motion To Dismiss, p. 5.
11. The defendants in the case are the American Guild of Variety Artists, and the
parent international of both locals, Association of Actors and Artistes of America. The
international was joined on the ground that it had violated its constitution by failing to
remedy the alleged violations. See Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to
Motion To Dismiss, p. 4. "[T]he relation of the Branches to each other in matters of
jurisdictions, infringement of territory, and all other matters of like nature, shall be
determined by the International Board." Associated Actors and Artistes of America Const.
p. 2 (1935).
12. Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion To Dismiss, pp. 8-10
13. Id. at 7, 8.
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The court held that section 301 was not restricted to collective-bargaining
agreements, and that whether the parties were separate organizations presented
a triable issue of fact. Defendants' motion was denied. 1
4
The court correctly refused to import the collective-bargaining restriction
on union-employer contracts into the between-labor-organizations clause, in
spite of a prior decision of another district court,', which had done so on the
basis of the employer clause's legislative history.10 In fact, no legislative history
exists which would aid interpretation of the "between... labor organizations"
language.17 This clause was first introduced at the House-Senate conference ;1S
consequently, references to 301 in congressional reports and debates are solely to
the union-employer provision. Moreover, the same conference, by eliminating
a provision which would have limited section 301 to contracts "concluded as
a result of collective bargaining,"'19 may have indicated that other agreements
were to be included.2 0 Indeed, restricted to collective-bargaining agreements,
the between-labor-organizations clause would be meaningless. 2 ' Arguably, any
14. 42 L.RR.M-. at 2819.
15. Sun Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. Industrial Union of Marine Workers, 95
F. Supp. 50 (F.D. Pa. 1950) (dispute between loyal and disaffiliated locals over owner-
ship of check-off dues).
16. Id. at 53. Distinguishing Sun Shipbuilding, the Burlesque court argued that before
§ 301 was sent to the conference committee, provision had been made only for "contracts
concluded as the result of collective bargaining," and that the legislative history, which
was concerned with this form of the provision alone, was not conclusive. 42 L.R.R.M.
2819.
17. "Legislative history of § 301 is obscure and little help in our search for an answer
to the question whether Congress intended to give unions such status that they could sue,
and respond in a district court, in an inter-union piece of litigation." United Textile
Workers v. Textile Workers Union, 258 F.2d 743, 748 (7th Cir. 1958).
18. The only specific mention of the between-labor-organizations clause in the legisla-
tive history is in a summary by Senator Taft of the changes made by the conference com-
mittee: "Section 301 differs from the Senate bill in ... [that it] provides that suits for
violation of contracts between labor organizations, as well as between a labor organization
and an employer, may be brought in the Federal courts." 2 NLRB, op. cit. stpra note 5,
at 1535, 1543 (1948).
19. Section 301(a) of the bill, which originally passed the Senate, provided for juris-
diction in "suits for violation of contracts concluded as the result of collective bargaining
between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry
affecting commerce . . . ." H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947) (Senate version)
Section 302(a) of the bill which originally passed the House provided for jurisdiction
in "Any action for or proceeding involving a violation of an agreement between an
employer and a labor organization or other representative of employees . . ." H.R. 3020,
80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947) (House version). Both bills are set out in 1 NLRB, op. cit supra
note 5, at 158, 226.
20. See 42 L.R.M. at 2819.
21. The defendants in Burlesque Artists, who contended that the between-labor-organi-
zations provision referred only to collective bargaining agreements, attempted to solve this
problem by asserting that "the phrase... was inserted for the purpose of permitting en-
forcement of collective bargaining agreements where more than one union was party
thereto." Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion To Dismiss, p. 10. The
1959]
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contract between unions could be viewed as a collective-bargaining agreement-
the result of bargaining between collective entities. But "collective-bargaining
agreements" is a term of art: it covers only employment contracts negotiated
between management and labor.22
While the Burlesque court did not explain why 301 applied to the facts
before it, its holding could have been based on state law. Treating the inter-
national's constitution as a contract 23 accords with many decisions thus
characterizing such constitutions. 24 Indeed, several of these cases were suits
difficulty with this solution is that any such contract is, by definition, also a contract
between an employer and a labor organization. Consequently, such agreements can be
enforced in any case under the union-employer clause.
22. "Collective bargaining broadly defined is an agreement between an employer and a
labor union which regulates the terms and conditions of employment . . . ." Railway Mail
Ass'n v. Murphy, 180 Misc. 868, 873. 44 N.Y.S.2d 601, 605-06 (Sup. Ct. 1943). See also
the legislative history cited in note 5 supra.
23. Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Motion To Dismiss, p. 5. The
court must have agreed with plaintiff's allegation since no other contract between the parties
was alleged.
24. E.g., Francis v. Scott, 260 Ala. 595, 72 So. 2d 98 (1954) ; Local 1140, United Elec.
Workers v. United Elec. Workers, 232 Minn. 217, 45 N.W.2d 408 (1950) ; Harker v. Mc-
Kissock, 7 N.J. 323, 81 A.2d 480 (1951) ; Barnhart v. UAW-CIO, 12 N.J. Super. 147, 79
A.2d 88 (App. Div. 1951) ; Jurewicz v. Locals 1297, 1392, 2343, United Bhd. of Carpenters,
138 N.J. Eq. 493, 49 A.2d 23 (Ch. 1946) ; Harris v. Geier, 112 N.J. Eq. 99, 164 Atl. 50
(Ch. 1932) ; Nilan v. Colleran, 283 N.Y. 84, 27 N.E.2d 511 (1940); Hogan v. Williams, 185
Misc. 338, 55 N.Y.S.2d 904 (Sup. Ct. 1945), aff'd per curiam, 270 App. Div. 789, 59
N.Y.S.2d 331 (1946) ; Carey v. International Bhd. of Paper Makers, 123 Misc. 680, 206
N.Y.S. 73 (Sup. Ct. 1924) ; Harris ex rel. Carpenters Union 2573, Lumber Workers v.
Backman, 160 Ore. 520, 86 P.2d 456 (1939) ; International Printing Pressmen Union v.
Smith, 145 Tex. 399, 198 S.W.2d 729 (1946); Local 104, Int'l Bhd. of Boilermakers v.
International Bhd. of Boilermakers, 28 Wash. 2d 536, 183 P.2d 504 (1947), aff'd per curiam
on rehearing en banc, 189 P.2d 648 (Wash. 1948) ; Furniture Workers Union v. United
Bhd. of Carpenters, 6 Wash. 2d 654, 108 P.2d 651 (1940) ; see Snooks v. Vejlupek, 87 F.
Supp. 503 (N.D. Ohio 1949) (dictum) (applying state law). The artificiality of this
characterization has, however, resulted in severe criticism by commentators. See, e.g.,
Chafee, The Internal Affairs of Associations Not for Profit, 43 Hv. L. REv. 993, 1002-04
(1930) ; Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Discipline, 64 HARv. L. Riv. 1049, 1055
(1951). But see Meltzer, The Supreme Court, Congress, and State Jurisdiction Over Labor
Relations: I, 59 COLum. L. REv. 6, 43 n.132 (1959).
The Burlesque holding that locals can be parties under the between-labor-organizations
clause could also be supported. Locals are proper parties within the meaning of the employer-
union clause. See, e.g., General Elec. Co. v. Local 205, United Elec. Workers, 353 U.S.
547 (1957); Shirley-Herman Co. v. International Hod Carriers, 182 F.2d 806 (2d Cir.
1950); Rock Drilling Union v. Mason & Hanger Co., 90 F. Supp. 539 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
And federal courts have treated other provisions in the act in a like manner. See, e.g.,
NLRB v. Local 1229, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 346 U.S. 464 (1953) (National Labor
Relations Act (Wagner Act) § 8(a) (1). 49 Stat. 452 (1935) as amended, 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a) (1.) (1958)); Douds v. Local 1250, Retail Union, CIO, 173 F.2d 764 (2d Cir.
1949) (National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act) § 8(b) (4) (c), 49 Stat. 452 (1935),
as amended, Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) 61 Stat. 141-42 (1947),
29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (c) (1958)). See also Labor-Management Reporting & Disclosure
Act (Landrum-Griffin Act) § 3(j) (2), No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (1959).
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between locals and internationals.2 5 But employment of such state precedents
as a basis for 301 jurisdiction would bring federal courts into internal union
affairs. Thus, these cases involved such matters as: revocation of a local's
charter ;28 disposition of local assets upon disaffiliation, disbandment, or receiver-
ship;27 and election or appointment of officials, members, or trustees.2s The
25. See, e.g., United Pub. Workers v. Local 312, United Pub. Workers, '4 F. Supp.
538 (E.D. Mich. 1950) (applying state law); Local 76, United Bhd. of Carpenters v.
United Bhd. of Carpenters, 143 La. 902, 79 So. 532 (1918); Lodge 405, Int'l Ass'n of
Machinists v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 134 Md. 355, 106 At. 692 (1919) ; Hotel
Employees v. Hotel Employees Int'l, 212 Minn. 587, 4 N.W2d 771 (1942); Local 373,
Int'l Ass'n of Ironworkers v. International Ass'n of Ironworkers, 120 N.J. Eq. 220, 184 Ati.
531 (Ct. Err. & App. 1936); United Bhd. of Carpenters v. Local 14, United Bhd. of
Carpenters, 178 S.W.2d 558 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944) ; Local 104, Int'l Bhd. of Boilermakers
v. International Bhd. of Boilermakers, 28 Wash. 2d 536, 183 P2d 504 (1947), aff'd pcr
curiam on rehearing en bane, 189 P2d 648 (Wash. 1948); Furniture Workers' Union V.
United Bhd. of Carpenters, 6 Wash. 2d 654, 108 P.2d 651 (1940).
26. Francis v. Scott, 260 Ala. 595, 72 So. 2d 98 (1954) ; Ellis v. AFL, 48 Cal. App. 2d
440, 120 P2d 79 (Dist. Ct. App. 1941) ; Gardner v. Newbert, 74 Ind. App. 183, 12S N.E. 704
(1920); Barbrick v. Huddell, 245 1fass. 428, 139 N.E. 629 (1923) ; Minnesota Council
of State Employees v. American Fed'n of State Employees, 220 Minn. 179, 19 N.W2d 414
(1945) ; Kehoe v. Leonard, 176 App. Div. 626, 163 N.Y. Supp. 357 (1917) ; Kehoc V. Sokol.
82 N.Y.S.2d 196 (Sup. Ct. 1948) ; Bhd. of Painters v. Garrett, 185 Misc. 61, 56 N.Y.S2d
30 (Sup. Ct. 1945); Reinhardt v. National Council of Marine Draftsmen, 50 N.Y.S2d 446
(Sup. Ct. 1944); United Bhd. of Carpenters v. Local 14, United Bhd. of Carpenters, 178
S.W.2d 558 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944); Furniture Workers' Union v. United Bhd. of Car-
penters, 6 Wash. 2d 654, 108 P2d 651 (1940).
27. Textile Workers Union v. Federal Labor Union 2150D, 240 Ala. 239, 198 So. 606
(1940) (disaffiliation); Pizer v. Brown, 133 Cal. App. 2d 367, 283 P.2d 1055 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1955) cert. denied, 351 U.S. 982 (1956) (disbandment); Peterson v. Evans, 23 I11.
App. 623, 6 N.E.2d 520 (1937) (disbandment) ; Edwards v. Leopoldi, 20 N.J. Super. 43,
89 A.2d 264 (App. Div. 1952) (disaffiliation) ; United Pub. Workers v. Fennimore, 6 N.J.
Super. 589, 70 A.2d 901 (Ch. 1950) (disaffiliation) ; Reichert v. United Bhd. of Carpenters,
14 N.J. Misc. 106. 183 A. 728 (Ch. 1936) (disaffiliation) ; Wolchok v. Kovenetsky, 274 App.
Div. 282, 83 N.Y.S.2d 431 (1948) (disaffiliation); Feller v. Egeihofer, 125 N.Y.S.2d 816
(Sup. Ct 1953) (disaffliation) ; Suffridge v. O'Grady, 84 N.Y.S2d 211 (Sup. Ct. 1948)
(disaffiliation) ; Hogan v. Williams, 185 Misc. 338, 55 N.Y.S.2d 904 (Sup. Ct. 1945), aff'd
per curiam, 270 App. Div. 789, 59 N.Y.S.2d 331 (1946) (disaffiliation) ; Mursenar v. Forte,
186 Ore. 253, 205 P.2d 568 (1949) (receivership); Lumber Workers Union v. International
Wood Workers, 197 Wash. 491, 85 P.2d 1099 (1938) (disaffiliation); Centralia Labor
Temple Ass'n v. O'Day, 139 Wash. 331, 246 Pac. 930 (1926) (disaffiliation).
28. De Monbrun v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, 140 Cal. App. 2d 546, 295 P.2d
881 (Dist. Ct App. 1956) ; Lawless v. Brotherhood of Painters, 143 Cal. App. 2d 474, 300
P.2d 159 (Dist. Ct. App. 1956); Robinson v. Nick, 235 Mo. App. 461, 136 S.W.2d 374
(1940); Naylor v. Harkins, 27 N.J. Super. 594, 99 A.2d 849 (Ch. 1953), rcv'd in tort,
32 N.J. Super. 559, 109 A2d 19 (App. Div. 1954) ; Local 373, Int'l Ass'n of Ironmakers v.
International Ass'n of Ironmakers, 120 N.J. Eq. 220, 184 A. 531 (Ct. Err. & App. 1936) ;
Canfield v. Moreschi, 268 App. Div. 64, 48 N.Y.S.2d 668 (1944), aff'd per curiam, 294 N.Y.
632, 64 N.E.2d 177 (1945), modifying 182 Misc. 195, 49 N.Y.S2d 903 (Sup. Ct. 1944);
Fanara v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 205 Misc. 538, 128 N.Y.S2d 449 (Sup. Ct.
1954) ; Cromwell v. Mforrin, 91 N.Y.S.2d 176 (Sup. Ct. 1949); Margolis v. Burke, 53
N.Y.S.2d 157 (Sup. Ct. 1945); Sullivan v. McFetridge, 183 Misc. 106, 50 N.Y.S2d 385
1959]
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Landrum-Griffin Act will, of course, require federal courts to hear disputes
concerning trusteeships and elections.29 Unlike suits brought under section
301, however, in which federal courts must fashion a new body of substantive
law, 30 cases under the recent legislation will be governed by detailed statutory
provisions which accompany the jurisdictional grant.31 In the absence of such
a comprehensive legislative scheme, courts generally have evinced a reluctance
to intervene in internal union affairs.3 2 Federal courts have utilized the real-
party-in-interest and indispensable-party doctrines to destroy diversity, and
thus deny jurisdiction. 33 Even state courts of general jurisdiction require both
that all internal remedies have been exhausted,3 4 and that the "contract" viola-
(Sup. Ct.), aff'd per curiam, 268 App. Div. 962, 51 N.Y.S.2d 371 (1944) ; Polin v. Kaplan,
135 Misc. 828, 238 N.Y. Supp. 460 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd per curiam, 231 App. Div. 849, 246
N.Y. Supp. 522 (1930), rev'd, 257 N.Y. 277, 177 N.E. 833 (1931) ; Way v. Patton, 195 Ore.
36, 241 P.2d 895 (1952) ; Retail Clerks Union v. Westling, 41 Wash. 2d 90, 247 P.2d 253
(1952) ; Cook v. Collins, 131 W. Va. 475, 48 S.E.2d 161 (1948).
29. Labor-Management Reporting & Disclosure Act, No. 86-257, tits. III & IV, 73 Stat.
519 (1959). These titles provide standards for elections and trusteeships and federal jurisdic-
tion for suits based on violations of them. Burlesque Artists, however, involved neither
elections nor trusteeships, and would therefore not be subject to these provisions.
30. See Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). Lincoln Mills inter-
preted only the union-employer clause. It is highly doubtful, however, that Congress intended
two successive clauses in the same provision to be controlled by different bodies of law.
Cf. 2 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 4703 (3d ed. 1943).
31. See note 29 supra.
32. See Bradford v. International Bhd. of Locomotive Engineers, 188 La. 819, 831,
178 So. 362, 366 (1938) ; Ace Bus Transp. Co. v. Boulevard Bus Owners Ass'n, 118 N.J.
Eq. 31, 177 Atl. 360 (Ch.), aff'd, 119 N.J. Eq. 37, 180 Atl. 835 (Ct. Err. & App. 1935) ;
Dakchoylous v. Ernst, 203 Misc. 277, 281, 118 N.Y.S.2d 455, 458 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 282
App. Div. 1101, 126 N.Y.S.2d 534 (1953) ("The general policy of the courts is one of
noninterference with the internal affairs of labor organizations."); International Bhd. of
Locomotive Engineers v. Marshall, 119 S.W.2d 908 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938).
33. See, e.g., Murphy v. Hotel Employees Union, 102 F. Supp. 488 (E.D. Mich. 1951);
Fitzgerald v. Santoianni, 95 F. Supp. 438 (D. Conn. 1950) ; ef. United Elec. Workers v.
Derrickson, 102 A.2d 921 (Del. Ch. 1954). See also Underwood v. Maloney, 256 F.2d
334 (3d Cir. 1958), Note, 68 YALE L.J. 1182 (1959); Seslar v. Union Local 901, Inc.,
186 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1951) (refusal to merge individual claims to establish jurisdictional
amount).
34. Greenwood v. Building Trades Council, 71 Cal. App. 159, 233 Pac. 823 (1925):
Randolph v. Leeman, 146 N.E.2d 267 (Ind. App. Ct. 1957); Hotel Employees Union v.
Hotel Employees Int'l, 212 Minn. 587, 4 N.W.2d 771 (1942) ; Mogelever v. Newark News-
paper Guild, 124 N.J. Eq. 60, 199 Atl. 56 (Ct. Err. & App. 1938); Keller v. Lindelhof,
268 App. Div. 877, 50 N.Y.S.2d 705 (1944), aff'd per curiain, 294 N.Y. 717, 61 N.E.2d
452 (1945), reversing 45 N.Y.S.2d 523 (Sup. Ct. 1943); Price v. United Ass'n of
Journeymen Plumbers, 11 N.Y.S.2d 660 (Sup. Ct. 1939) ; Way v. Patton, 195 Ore. 36, 241
P.2d 895 (1952) ; Liming v. Maloney, 32 Tenn. App. 632, 225 S.W.2d 276 (1949): Con-
stantino v. Moreschi, 9 Wash. 2d 638, 115 P.2d 955 (1941). Contra, De Monbrun v. Sheet
Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, 140 Cal. App. 2d 546, 295 P.2d 881 (Dist. Ct. App. 1956):
Webster v. Rankins, 50 S.W.2d 746 (Mo. Ct. App. 1932) (international's interference with
local elections clearly arbitrary); Hickman v. Kline, 71 Nev. 55, 279 P.2d 662 (1955)
(appeal futile) ; Harris v. Geier, 112 N.J. Eq. 99, 164 Atl. 50 (Ch. 1932) (remoteness of
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tion involves either loss of property rights or deprivation of due process ,'
before granting relief.
Judicial attitudes aside, analysis of Taft-Hartley's legislative history demon-
states that 301 was not intended to reach internal union affairs. Thus, in
debate on the anti-closed-shop provision,30 proponents of the bill replied to
charges that unions' status as independent self-governing organizations was
threatened 3 7 by stressing that any interference in internal matters would be
restricted to the narrow area of employment opportunities.3 8 Consequently,
Burlesque Artists, if read to include internal affairs within the ambit of 301,
should be rejected. Admittedly, exclusion of internal matters would reduce
the possible scope of the between-labor-organizations clause. The only other
type of contract between unions which has been litigated under 301 is the juris-
dictional agreement between independent internationals.3 9 If the labor-organi-
internal remedies) ; Local 373, Int'l Ass'n of Ironworkers v. International Ass'n of Iron-
workers, 120 N.J. Eq. 220, 184 At. 531 (Ct. Err. & App. 1936) (dictum) ; Walshe v.
Sherlock, 110 N.J. Eq. 223, 159 Ati. 661 (Ch. 1932) (dictum).
35. See, e.g., Local 57, Bhd. of Painters v. Boyd, 16 So. 2d 705 (Ala. 1944) ; Ellis v.
AFL, 48 Cal. App. 2d 440, 120 P.2d 79 (Dist. Ct. App. 1941); Gardner v. Newbert, 74
Ind. App. 183, 128 N.E. 704 (1920); Barbrick v. Huddell, 245 Mass. 428, 139 N.E. 629
(1923) ; Barnhart v. UAV-CIO, 12 N.J. Super. 147, 79 A2d 88 (App. Div. 1951) ; Pratt
v. Rudisule, 249 App. Dih% 305, 292 N.Y. Supp. 68 (1936) ; Kehoe v. Leonard, 163 N.Y.
Supp. 357 (App. Div. 1917) ; Mursener v. Forte, 186 Ore. 253,205 P.2d 568 (1949) ; Lundine
v. McKinney, 183 S.W.2d 265 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944) ; United Bhd. of Carpenters v. Local
14, United Bhd. of Carpenters, 178 S.W2d 558 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944) ; Furniture Workers'
Union v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 6 Wash. 2d 654, 10 P.2d 651 (1940) ; Cox v. United
Bhd. of Carpenters, 190 Wash. 511, 69 P.2d 148 (1937) ; Herman v. UAW, 264 Wis. 562,
59 N.W2d 475 (1953).
Some courts have explicitly made the distinction between the "social" and "property"
rights of members of unions, affording protection only to the latter. See, e.g., De Monbrun
v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, 140 Cal. App. 2d 546, 295 P2d 881 (Dist. Ct. App.
1956) ; Lo Bianco v. Cushing, 117 NJ. Eq. 593, 177 Atl. 102 (Ch. 1935), aff'd per curiam,
119 N.J. Eq. 377, 182 Ati. 874 (Ct. Err. & App. 1936) ; Way v. Patton, 195 Ore. 36, 241
P.2d 895 (1952). See also Local 104, Int'l Bhd. of Boilermakers v. International Bhd. of
Boilermakers, 28 Wash. 2d 536, 183 P2d 504 (1947), aff'd per curiam, 189 P2d 648 (Wash.
1948) (distinction between financial and disciplinary disputes).
36. It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents-
(2) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an em-
ployee in violation of subsection (a) (3) or to discriminate against an employee
with respect to whom membership in such organization has been denied or terminated
on some ground other than his failure to tender the periodic dues and the initiation
fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership;
National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act) § 8(b) (2), 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended.
Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §
158(b) (2) (1958).
37. See 2 NLRB, op. cit. sumra note 5, at 1095-97, 1176, 1514-16.
38. See 2 id. at 1097, 1139, 1141-42, 1420.
39. See United Textile Workers v. Textile Workers Union, 238 F.2d 743 (7th Cir.
1958). See also Copra v. Suro, 236 F.2d 107 (Ist Cir. 1956). This case denied § 301
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zations clause means anything, therefore, it must apply at least to such arrange-
ments.
Thus, the Seventh Circuit, in United Textile Workers v. Textile Workers
Union,40 upheld 301 jurisdiction in a suit between two internationals based
on violations of the AFL-CIO sponsored no-raiding pact.41 This holding ac-
cords with apparent congressional intent. While these agreements were not
specifically mentioned during the debates on 301, much of the discussion on
the bill was devoted to the problem of jurisdictional strikes. 42 Furthermore, by
providing a ten-day period before the arbitration powers of the National Labor
Relations Board are invoked to resolve such disputes,4 3 Congress seemingly
contemplated union reliance on their own agreements. Section 301 jurisdiction
makes these agreements more effective, by providing a ready means of en-
forcement.44
But extending Textile Workers to jurisdictional provisions in constitutions
granted to locals by internationals could expand 301 to internal disputes45
Further, the pact involved in Textile Workers, unlike the usual union consti-
tution, was a consensual agreement among quasi-independent internationals
of relatively equal bargaining power. 46 The typical local charter is, on the
jurisdiction in a dispute involving a welfare fund agreement among several unions and
an employers' association. In a dictum, the court seemed to indicate that, even in a
suit on a contract between labor organizations, an employer would be an indispensable
party for purposes of 301 jurisdiction. Id. at 113. In fact, however, the court was treating
the contract at issue as one "between the union and the employer association." Ibid.
40. 258 F.2d 743 (7th Cir. 1958).
41. Both unions had signed the AFL-CIO no-raiding pact, which was treated as the
contract involved, in spite of the fact that the Textile Workers Union had not renewed its
signature after December 31, 1957, when the original agreement expired. Id. at 747.
The case involved an arbitrator's award which was violated by the defendant union. There
may soon be considerable litigation of this type in the federal courts as the recent AFL-
CIO convention has adopted a new compulsory arbitration scheme in jurisdictional
disputes. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 1959, p. 1, col. 2 (city ed.).
For the text of the no-raiding pact, see 32 L.R.R.M. 42 (1953).
42. See 1. NLRB, op. cit. supra note 5, at 414, 615; 2 id. at 950-51, 995-97, 1056, 1654.
See also Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 8(b) (4) (D), 61 Stat.
142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (D) (1958).
43. Labor-Management Relations Act, § 10(k), 61 Stat. 149 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §
160(k) (1958).
44. "If we struck down § 301, the aim of the No-Raiding agreement would be nulli-
fied and it would be the same old familiar story where men enter agreements one party to
which either knows in advance, or later seeks to escape because, there is no enforcing
apparatus." United Textile Workers v. Textile Workers, 258 F.2d 743, 749 (7th Cir. 1958).
45. Cf. Minnesota Council of State Employees v. American Fed'n of State Employees,
220 Minn. 179, 19 N.W.2d 414 (1945) (attempt by international to set up new local with-
in an existing local's territory) ; Nilan v. Colleran, 283 N.Y. 84, 27 N.E.2d 511 (1940)
(same) ; Keller v. Lindelof, 45 N.Y.S.2d 523 (Sup. Ct. 1943), rev'd, 268 App. Div. 877,
50 N.Y.S.2d 705 (1944), aff'd per curiam,, 294 N.Y. 717, 61 N.E.2d 452 (1945) (same).
46. The relatively equal bargaining power of internationals involved in disputes among
themselves and with federations is illustrated in the disputes described in Jaffe, Inter-
Union Disputes in Search of a Forum, 49 YALE L.J. 424 (1940) and 2 NLRB, op. cit.
(Vol. 69:299
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other hand, a codification of the rules appurtenant to a specific status, and not
a "contract." 47 Textile Workers should be precedent, therefore, only for con-
sensual agreements between autonomous unions.
The unusual organizational structure of the international union involved in
Burlesque Artists might bring it within even tis narrow construction of Tex-
tile Workers. Thus, the international merely coordinates the activities of
branches.48 In policy matters, locals are allowed a degree of self-determination
approaching autonomy.49 As a result, the constitution at bar might be regarded
as similar to the AFL-CIO no-raiding pact. But such an approach to deciding
the consensual nature of a local's charter would be inefficacious, in view of the
numerous and interrelated factors-e.g., control over finances,O strikes,51
collective bargaining ;52 individual personalities ;rs the local's influence 5'-upun
which a court would have to base its determination of a given local's autonomy.5
supra note 5, at 1056. The Teamsters-Brewery Workers dispute described by Jale re-
sulted in the cases of Green v. Obergfell, 121 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S.
637 (1941), reversing 29 F. Supp. 589 (D.D.C. 1939); International Bhd. of Teamsters
v. International Union of Brewery Workers, 106 F.2d 871 (9th Cir. 1939); Obergfell v.
Green, 27 F. Supp. 934 (D.D.C. 1939) ; California State Brewers Institute v. International
Bhd. of Teamsters, 19 F. Supp. 824 (N.D. Cal. 1937); United Union Brewing Co. v.
Beck, 200 Wash. 474, 93 P.2d 772 (1939). The inability of the new AFL-CIO federation
to impose conditions upon member internationals is discussed in Jacobs, The Xeyro
Worker Asserts His Rights, The Reporter, July 23, 1959, p. 16, at 20-21.
47. In the "normal" international-local relationship, the international is by far the
more powerful party. Rose, Relationship of the Local Union to the International Organica-
tion, 38 VA. L. RE%. 843, 863, 869-70 (1952). Given this fact, the characterization of a
local's charter as a "contract" may seriously be questioned. Summers, Union Schism js
Perspective: Flexible Doctrines, Double Standards, and Projected Atswers, 45 VA. L
REv. 261, 264 (1959); see REsTATEMExT, Co.mT Acrs § 497 (1932) (undue influence);
3 Coaism, Co.RA crs § 559 (1951) (interpretation against the party choosing the contract
terms); 1 Wm isToN, CoRaAcrs § 222 (rev. ed. 1936) (parties of limited capacity);
5 id. § 1625 (undue influence); KESSLER & SHAR, CASES ON CoNnAcrs ch. 1 (1953)
("From Status to Contract"); Kessler, Contracts of Adhesions--Somnc Thoughts About
Freedom of Contract, 43 COLum. L. REv. 629 (1943).
48. Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Motion To Dismiss, pp. 7-8.
49. See ibid. For example, no provision exists for the establishment of trusteeships
over locals in the Association of Actors and Artistes of America constitution.
50. See NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CONFER=NCE BD., INc, Uxio-; Govm.:mE:-;T STRUC-
TURE AND PRocEDURES 29-42 (Studies in Personnel Policy No. 150, 1955).
51. Id. at 45.
52. Id. at 49-51 (situations vary from those where the international negotiates the
agreement, to those where international approval is required, to where no approval is
required). See also Shister, The Locus of Union Control in Collective Bargaining, 60
Q.J. Ecox. 513 (1946).
53. See L.sTER, As UNIONs MATURE 89-104 (1958).
54. See, e.g., the special terms of affiliation granted to a local in Zander v. Lavegli,
34 L.R.R.M. 2455 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1954).
55. Some courts, relying on such external factors as the dates when the international
and local were founded and the organizational structure of the international, have attempted
to distinguish between dependent and independent locals. See, e.g., Moyer v. Butte Miners'
Union, 232 Fed. 788 (D. Mont. 1916), aff'd on other grounds, 246 Fed. 657 (9th Cir.
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These difficulties may dictate that the between-labor-organizations clause of 301
be limited to contracts between internationals.
1917), cert. denied, 245 U.S. 671 (1918); Vilella v. McGrath, 136 Conn. 645, 74 A.2d
187 (1950) ; Local 1140, United Elec. Workers v. United Elec. Workers, 232 Minn. 217,
45 N.W.2d 408 (1950) ; Harker v. McKissock, 7 N.J. 323, 81 A.2d 480 (1951) ; Inter-
national Brewery Workers v. Becherer, 142 N.J. Eq. 561, 61 A.2d 16 (Ch. 1948), aff'd,
4 N.J. Super. 456, 67 A.2d 900 (App. Div. 1949) ; Alexion v. Hollinsworth, 289 N.Y. 91,
43 N.E. 2d 825 (1942); Steinmiller v. McKeon, 21 N.Y.S.2d 621 (Sup. Ct. 1940), aff'd
without opinion, 261 App. Div. 891, 26 N.Y.S.2d 491 (1941), aff'd per curialls, 288 N.Y.
508, 41 N.E.2d 925 (1942) ; Local 13013, UMW v. Cikra, 86 Ohio App. 41, 90 N.E.2d
154 (1949) ; Federation of Ins. Employees v. United Office Workers, 77 R.I. 210, 74 A.2d
446 (1950). But such attempts have been severely criticized by commentators. See Rose,
supra note 47; Summers, supra note 47, at 264 & n.16:
Looking to the entire parent-local relationship has a first impression appeal. How-
ever, it ultimately leads the courts deep into the thickets of union structures.
Furthermore, it provides no intelligible guide as to how independent a local union
must be, and in what respects, to be entitled to walk out with assets in hand.10
16... [O]ne New Jersey judge held that a local of the union was independent
... but.., another New Jersey judge held that a different local of the same union
did not come within the [independence] doctrine.
For an analysis which concludes that locals possess no meaningful autonomy in the
"usual" local-international relationship, see Rose, supra note 47, at 843, 869-70. See also
Shister, Trade-Union Government: A Formal Analysis, 60 Q.J. EcoN. 78, 108-09 (1946).
